Sault Ste. Marie, Mens Rea and the Halfway House: Public Welfare Offences Get a Home of their Own by Hutchinson, Allan C.
Osgoode Hall Law Journal
Volume 17, Number 2 (August 1979) Article 6
Sault Ste. Marie, Mens Rea and the Halfway House:
Public Welfare Offences Get a Home of their Own
Allan C. Hutchinson
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, ahutchinson@osgoode.yorku.ca
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj
Article
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Osgoode Hall
Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Citation Information
Hutchinson, Allan C.. "Sault Ste. Marie, Mens Rea and the Halfway House: Public Welfare Offences Get a Home of their Own."
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 17.2 (1979) : 415-444.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol17/iss2/6
SA ULT STE. MARIE, MENS REA AND
THE HALFWAY HOUSE: PUBLIC
WELFARE OFFENCES GET A HOME
OF THEIR OWN
ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
A continuing source of dissatisfaction in Canadian criminal law has been
the uncertainty and confusion surrounding the status of absolute liability
offences.' Although this category of liability has been part of Anglo-Canadian
law in one form or another for well over a century,2 relatively few steps
have been taken by the courts to arrive at a clear and settled statement of its
applicability and scope in the criminal process.3 As Brian Hogan notes, "there
is no discernible pattern which enables the ordinary lawyer to predict with
any measure of confidence whether a particular offence will be held to be
one of [absolute] liability or not. Few areas of law have spawned so much
litigation and so little of it is edifying."'4 One of the greatest obstacles to
0 Copyright, 1979, Allan C. Hutchinson.
Of Gray's Inn, Barrister, Sessional Lecturer at Osgoode Hall Law School, York
University.
I would like to thank Professors Braithwaite, Grant and Taman for their helpful com-
ments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this paper. Errors, omissions and opinions
remain entirely my own.
1 The terms "strict liability" and "absolute liability" historically have been used, to
varying degrees, in an interchangeable fashion. However, in a strict sense, "absolute
liability" is a misnomer, as all the usual defences, such as duress or automatism, are
available. See Smith and Hogan, Criminal Law (4th ed. London: Butterworths, 1978) at
79; Brett, An Inquiry into Criminal Guilt (Sydney: Law Book Co. of Australasia, 1963);
Howard, Strict Responsibility (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1963); and Mewett and
Manning, Criminal Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1978) at 122. Nevertheless, for reasons
that will become clear, "absolute liability" will be used throughout this paper to refer
to what is now known as "absolute" or "strict liability," and "strict liability" will take
the particular meaning attached to it by the Supreme Court of Canada in this case.
2 The first move away from fault-based liability occurred in the middle of the nine-
teenth century in the cases of R. v. Woodrow (1846), 15 M. & W. 404, 153 E.R. 907 (Ex.
Ct.); and R. v. Stephens, [1866] 1 Q.B. 702. This trend was reflected in other parts of the
common law world such as the United States and Australasia. See Sayre, Public Welfare
Offences (1933), 33 Colum. L. Rev. 55 at 62-67. As Howard notes, "the truth of the
matter is that no one knows why the doctrine appeared when it did, or at all; we know
only how it appeared." Supra note 1, at 13.
3 The courts have seemed content to decide each particular issue on its merits rather
than attempt to fit the decision into some wider and more comprehensive context. Indeed,
this piecemeal approach can be attributed to the tendency of the courts to subsume the
problem under statutory interpretation. This serves simply to exacerbate the situation;
see text accompanying notes 113-15, infra. Notwithstanding this, the legislature must take
at least an equal portion of the responsibility for the existing state of affairs.
4 Hogan, Working Paper 2: Strict Liability (1975), 7 Ottawa L. Rev. 258 at 259.
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clarification lies in the inability or unwillingness of the courts to conceive
of the problem other than in exclusive terms of full mens rea or absolute
liability. All is darkness and light; there are no shades of grey. This restricted
and polarized approach inevitably leads the courts into a difficult predica-
ment, especially with regard to public welfare legislation: 5
If [the court] decides that the offence requires full mens rea, it may put an im-
possible burden on P and thereby virtually nullify the legislation. But if it decides
that P need prove no mental element at all, it runs the risk of penalizing innocent
and guilty alike to the detriment of justice and respect for law.6
In recent years, however, the courts have taken a more responsive
attitude and have been prepared to grapple with the problem. Attempts have
been made to mediate the traditional polarity of approach. The result of
this trend has been that the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. City of Sault
Ste. Marie7 has seen fit to introduce a third category of liability that lies be-
tween the requirement of full mens rea and the imposition of absolute liability.
As such, the decision is a crucial one and holds wide-ranging implications
for the whole field of criminal law.8 Accordingly, the purpose of this comment
will be to measure the success the Court has had in clearing up the uncer-
tainty and dissatisfaction surrounding absolute liability offences. However,
while the reduction of uncertainty in the law is a laudable aim that must be
given constant encouragement, especially in an area of law where liability
is intended to be imposed without fault, it is not enough in and of itself.9
5For a discussion and definition of such legislation, see text accompanying note 66,
infra.
6Howard, Strict Responsibility in the High Court of Australia (1960), 76 L.Q.
Rev. 547.
7 (1978), 85 D.L.R. (3d) 161, 40 C.C.C. (2d) 353 (S.C.C.). The Court was made
up of Laskin C.J.C., Martland, Ritchie, Spence, Pigeon, Dickson, Beetz, Estey and Pratte JJ.
8 While this comment will concentrate on the implications of the decision for the
criminal law, the decision is obviously of great significance for environmentalists. Their
initial response is likely to be that any softening of the law or change that is likely to
result in fewer convictions is a bad one. However, in reply, it can be said that the Court
is simply bringing the law into line with practice. Evidence suggests that, in reality, those
entrusted with enforcement are extremely reluctant to prosecute without there being some
degree of fault on the part of the offender. For a thorough analysis of the problems of
enforcement in public welfare offences, see Studies on Strict Liability (Ottawa: Law
Reform Commission of Canada, 1974) at 63-151.
9 Although consistency and certainty in the law are eminently desirable for, as
Edmund Burke noted, where certainty ends, injustice begins, this must not be allowed to
take precedence over the substance and content of the rules. This problem is given a
fresh, yet equally forceful, airing by Ehrlich and Posner:
The "chilling" of socially valuable behaviour by an uncertain law is a potentially
serious problem whenever criminal penalties are involved ... Not only do criminal
sanctions tend to be severe (costly) but it is normally impossible to purchase
insurance against criminal liability. The average individual can avoid the risk of
being subjected to a criminal penalty only by avoiding criminal activity. But if
what constitutes criminal activity is uncertain this is not enough: he can eliminate
the risk only by avoiding, in addition to clearly criminal behaviour, all other be-
haviour that is within the penumbra of the vague standard. And he may very well
do this, even though the penumbral activity is quite valuable privately as well as
socially: a rational individual, especially if he is risk averse, may incur heavy costs
to avoid even a slight risk of criminal punishment. Thus, the social costs of vague
criminal standards might be high.
An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking (1974), 3 J. Leg. Stud. 257 at 263.
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Mindful of this limitation, this paper will also consider whether the
solution and scheme arrived at by the Court is a desirable one, in the sense
of fitting into and promoting the primary goals and structure of criminal
justice in general. Considering that around 90 percent of all offences outside
the Criminal Code impose some form of absolute liability and that, on aver-
age, at least one in twenty-five Canadians is convicted of such an offence each
year,10 the decision is not just grist for the academic mill. Its effect upon the
actual administration and enforcement of law is manifest. Accordingly, the
decision provides an opportunity to explore more fully some of the central
issues raised and to consider the role that the court perceives for itself in
such matters. In order to achieve such an objective, and for ease and clarity
of debate, it is convenient to divide discussion into four main categories: a
thorough analysis of the case and its handling of existing authorities; the
doctrinal issues surrounding the validity and acceptability of absolute liability
in an overall scheme of mens rea; the precise nature and scope of this new
middle ground of liability; and the method of categorisation to be used in
assigning particular offences to the appropriate level of liability.
II. THE CASE
The factual circumstances of the case are of an entirely unremarkable
and prosaic nature, although they do concern the very real and pressing prob-
lem of pollution control." In November, 1970, the City of Sault Ste. Marie
entered into an agreement with Cherokee Disposal and Construction Co. Ltd.
to dispose of all the city's refuse. As a direct result of the methods of disposal
used by the company, the Root River and Cannon Creek became polluted.
The company was charged and convicted under section 32(1) of The Ontario
Water Resources Act. 12 The question arose whether the City should also be
convicted under the same section:
[E]very municipality or person that discharges or deposits, or causes, or permits
the discharge or deposit of any material of any kind into any water ... that may
impair the quality of water, is guilty of an offence and, on summary conviction, is
liable on first conviction to a fine of not more than $5,000 and on each subsequent
conviction to a fine of not more than $10,000, or to imprisonment for a term
of not more than one year, or to both fine and imprisonment. 13
From such humble beginnings, the case managed to find its way through five
courts, including the Supreme Court of Canada, and became something of a
cause cjlkbre. Its passage through the various courts is indicative of the
prevailing confusion, and the case provides an excellent illustration of the
limited approach that has characterized and plagued the development of the
law in this area. Each court felt obliged to take the overly simplistic view
that either full mens rea was required or no mens rea was required at all.
10 These figures are based on research carried out by Fitzgerald and Elton, "The
Size of the Problem," in Studies on Strict Liability, supra note 8, at 41-61.
11 See Anisman, Water Pollution Control in Ontario (1971-72), 5 Ottawa L. Rev. 342.
12 R. v. Cherokee Disposals & Construction Ltd. (1973), 13 C.C.C. (2d) 87 (Ont.
Prov. Ct.).
13 R.S.O. 1970, c. 332, s. 32(1).
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None of the lower courts felt able or sufficiently confident to tread some
middle ground.
At first instance in the Provincial Court (Criminal Division), Judge Greco
dismissed the information laid, as the City had had nothing to do with the
actual disposal activities. On an appeal de novo, Judge Vannini reversed the
decision and convicted the City. He held that mens rea was not an essential
ingredient of the offence and that the City could commit such an offence in
a vicarious capacity. In the Divisional Court, the conviction was set aside. 4
In reaching this decision, the Court relied upon the fact that the charge was
bad for duplicity.' 5 However, the Court did feel that the problem of whether
the offence required mens rea or not was of sufficient importance to warrant
further consideration. After a workmanlike survey of the relevant law, the
Court decided that the offence was not one of absolute liability and that proof
of mens rea was required:
As far as the general subject-matter of s. 32(1) of the Ontario Water Resources
Act is concerned, we accept without reservation that the prohibition of water
pollution is in "the interests of health, convenience, safety and general welfare"
and hence fit and proper subject-matter for categorization as an offence of [abso-
lute] liability .... It is our view that the offence of discharging or depositing im-
pairing material is one of [absolute] liability. However, we do not think that the
general subject-matter of the legislation, in itself, has this result with respect to
the "permitting" offence. 16
On a further appeal to the Ontario Court of Appeal, it was held that
the conviction could not be quashed on the issue of duplicity, as the matter
had not been raised in the original trial at first instance.' 7 Nonetheless, the
Court did agree that mens rea was an essential ingredient of the offence.
Further, a majority of the Court, Lacourci~re J.A. dissenting,18 was of the
opinion that there was insufficient evidence to establish the necessary degree
of mens rea and, therefore, ordered a new trial. In response to this unsatis-
factory train of hearings, the Supreme Court of Canada, mindful of the impor-
tant legal issues to be resolved, granted leave to the Crown to appeal and
to the City to cross-appeal. 19
In a unanimous judgment, delivered by Dickson J., the Supreme Court
of Canada dismissed both appeals and ordered a new trial. The Court did not
feel itself bound by the traditional and polarized approach to the question of
liability and the degree of mens rea required for any particular offence.
Adopting a scheme suggested by Estey C.J.H.C. in his dissenting judgment in
14 (1975), 13 O.R. (2d) 113, 30 C.C.C. (2d) 257 (Div. Ct.).
15 The Supreme Court finally decided that the charge was not bad for duplicity as
"causing" and "permitting" were held simply to be different modes of committing the
same offence, namely, pollution of the river. See supra note 7, at 167-70 (D.L.R.), 359-
62 (C.C.C.).
16 Supra note 14, at 125 (O.R.), 269 (C.C.C.) per Morden J.
17 (1976), 13 O.R. (2d) 139, 30 C.C.C. (2d) 283 (Brooke, Lacourci6re and How-
land JJ. A.).
Is Id. at 140-56 (O.R.), 284-300 (C.C.C.).
19 A motion for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada (Laskin C.J.C.,
Ritchie and Spence JJ.) was granted on November 1, 1976.
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R. v. Hickey,20 the Court replaced the existing dual basis of liability with a
three-tiered structure of liability:
1. Offences in which mens rea, consisting of some positive state of mind such as
intent, knowledge, or recklessness, must be proved by the prosecution either
as an inference from the nature of the act committed, or by additional evi-
dence.
2. Offences in which there is no necessity for the prosecution to prove the exis-
tence of mens rea; the doing of the prohibited act prima facie imports the
offence, leaving it open to the accused to avoid liability by proving that he
took all reasonable care. This involves consideration of what a reasonable
man would have done in the circumstances. The defence will be available if
the accused reasonably believed in a mistaken set of facts which, if true, would
render the act or omission innocent, or if he took all reasonable steps to avoid
the particular events. These offences may properly be called offences of strict
liability.
3. Offences of absolute liability where it is not open to the accused to exculpate
himself by showing that he was free of fault L21
Although the Court claimed to rely upon and follow "an increasing and im-
pressive stream of authority" in arriving at this decision to establish a defence
of due diligence, 22 its handling of those authorities leaves much to be desired
and falls short of the standards expected of a system's highest appellate court.
For the purposes of this paper, the Court's treatment of earlier cases can be
dealt with in three segments. First of all, the Court placed great weight on
a series of decisions in lower courts which, in recent years, it had studiously
ignored23 or steadfastly refused to follow. For instance, as early as 1923, in
R. v. Regina Cold Storage & Forwarding Co.,24 a case involving unlawful
possession of liquor, Haultain C.J. favoured the position that the "[a]bsence of
mens rea means an honest and reasonable belief by the accused in the exis-
tence of facts which, if true, would make the act charged against him inno-
cent."'25 A similar line was taken thirty years later by Sheppard J. in R. v.
Laroque.20 More recently in Mclver-27 and Custeau,28 MacKay J.A. categor-
ized careless driving as an offence of absolute liability, but held that it was
20 (1976), 12 O.R. (2d) 578, 68 D.L.R. (3d) 88, 29 C.C.C. (2d) 23 (Ont. H.C.),
rev'd (1977), 13 O.R. (2d) 228, 70 D.L.R. 689 (Ont. C.A.). It must be remembered that
Estey J. was a member of the Supreme Court in the case under discussion.
21 Supra note 7, at 181 (D.L.R.), 373 (C.C.C.).
22 Id. at 172 (D.L.R.), 364 (C.C.C.).
23 For instance, although MacKay J.A. gave a balanced and full judgment in R. v.
King (1961), 129 C.C.C. 391 (Ont. C.A.); and R. v. Mclver, [1965] 2 O.R. 475, [1965]
4 C.C.C. 182 (C.A.), on the importance and significance of a "halfway house," his
opinion was not even mentioned when the Supreme Court heard and decided appeals
from both cases: [1962] S.C.R. 746 and [1966] S.C.R. 254.
24 [1923] 3 W.W.R. 1387, 41 C.C.C. 21 (Sask. C.A.). The reliance placed on this
decision is baffling. Haultain C.J. is talking about the issue of mistake of fact and not
about the standard of care. Moreover, it has since been decided that the use of an objec-
tive standard is no longer appropriate when assessing the belief of the accused: see
DPP v. Morgan, [1976] A.C. 182, [1975] 2 All E.R. 347 (H.L.); and R. v. Rees,
[1956] S.C.R. 640, 4 D.L.R. (2d) 406, 115 C.C.C. 1.
25 R. v. Regina Cold Storage & Forwarding Co., id. at 1389 (W.W.R.), 23 (C.C.C.).
26 (1958), 25 W.W.R. 434, 120 C.C.C. 246 (B.C.C.A.).
27 Supra note 23.
28 [1972] 2 O.R. 250, 6 C.C.C. (2d) 179 (C.A.).
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open to the accused to show that [actus reus] occurred without fault or negli-
gence on his part.2 9 Furthermore, there has been a series of cases30 under
section 32(1) of The Ontario Water Resources Act, the section at issue in
the case under discussion. In a comprehensive review of these cases, Professor
Jobson claims that the courts have "openly acknowledged a defence based
on lack of fault or neglect: these cases require proof of the actus reus but
then permit the accused to show that he was without fault or had no oppor-
tunity to prevent the harm." 3'
However, this stream of authority does not flow unchecked, and there
is a flood of cases32 in which the courts have chosen not to consider the possi-
bility or validity of some middle ground of liability. In the Supreme Court of
Canada, there has been a quintet of leading cases33 in which the problem
of absolute liability has arisen and, in each instance, the court has construed
the matter in traditionally dichotomous terms and refrained from addressing
itself to the viability of an intermediate option. The efforts of the Court to
distinguish these decisions, which might with more integrity have been simply
overruled, 34 forms the second ground of complaint. In particular, the Court
made an ineffectual attempt to interpret narrowly its most recent decisions, in
Pierce Fisheries35 and Hill,"0 so that they could not be said to be dispositive
of the question of absolute liability offences, and so that they did not stand
in the way of the introduction of some middle ground.
In Pierce Fisheries, the defendant company was charged with being in
possession of undersized lobsters contrary to section 3(1) (b) of the Lobster
Fisheries Regulations, made under the Fisheries Act. 7 The Court, by a major.
ity of eight to one, reversing the decision of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court
Appeal Division,38 held that mens rea was not an essential ingredient of the
offence and ordered the case to be remitted for conviction. The Court quoted
with approval the dicta of Roach J.A. in R. v. Pee-Kay Smallwares Ltd.:
If on a prosecution for the offences created by the Act, the Crown had to prove
the evil intent of the accused, or if the accused could escape by denying such evil
29 R. v. Mclver, supra note 23, at 481 (O.R.), 190 (C.C.C.).
30 These include, inter alia, R. v. Industrial Tankers, Ltd., [1968] 2 O.R. 142, [1968]
4 C.C.C. 81 (Co. Ct.); R. v. Sheridan, [1973] 2 Q.R. 192 (Dist. Ct.); R. v. Liquid Cargo
Lines Ltd. (1974), 18 C.C.C. (2d) 428 (Ont. Prov. Ct.); R. v. North Canadian Enterprises
Ltd. (1974), 20 C.C.C. (2d) 242 (Ont. Prov. Ct.).
3 1 Jobson, Far From Clear (1976), 18 Crim. L.Q. 294 at 297.
32 To produce a list would not only be a lengthy process, but would serve no real
purpose. Suffice it to say that, apart from those cases listed by the Supreme Court and
a few other instances, all reported cases have taken such a polarized approach.
3 3 R. v. Rees, supra note 24; Beaver v. The Queen, [1957] S.C.R. 531, 118 C.C.C.
129; R. v. King, [1962] S.C.R. 746, 35 D.L.R. (2d) 386; R. v. Pierce Fisheries Ltd.,
[1971] S.C.R. 5, 12 C.R.N.S. 272; and Hill v. The Queen, [1975] 2 S.C.R. 402, 24 C.R.N.S.
297.
34 See text accompanying notes 54 and 55, infra.
35 Supra note 33.
361d.
37 P.C. 1963-745, SOR/63-173, made pursuant to s. 34 of the Fisheries Act, R.S.C.
1952, c. 119.
38 (1969), 4 D.L.R. (3d) 80, [1969] 4 C.C.C. 163.
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intent, the statute, by which it was obviously intended that there should be com-
plete control without the possibility of any leaks, would have so many holes in it
that in truth it would be nothing more than a legislative sieve.39
The Court decided that the true ratio of Pierce Fisheries was simply that, in
such offences, the Crown did not have to prove mens rea. Although the parti-
ticular facts in Pierce Fisheries made it unnecessary to decide whether the
defendant company had acted with due diligence, 40 the decision did not rule
out the possibility of a defence of reasonable care. For instance, it is likely
that the defendant company would have escaped conviction if they could
have shown that they had done everything possible to discover the presence
of undersized lobsters. Although this represents a not unreasonable interpre-
tation, 41 it is clear from the terms used and analysis made by the Court that
absolute liability was firmly in the minds of the judges when arriving at
their decision.
As regards the decision in Hill,42 the arguments employed by the Court
to get around it are tenuous at best. It was held by a majority of seven to two
that the offence of leaving the scene of an accident 43 can be committed even
though the accused honestly thought no damage had been caused. In reaching
its decision, the Court expressly relied upon Pierce Fisheries44 and construed
it as imposing strict liability.45 In Sault Ste. Marie, however, the Court did
not feel that this decision stood in the way of a possible defence of reason-
able care:
In Hill, the appellant was charged under the Highway Traffic Act with failing to
remain at the scene of an accident. Her car had "touched" the rear of another
vehicle. She did not stop, but drove off, believing no damage had been done. This
Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the offence was not one requiring
mens rea. In that case the essential fact was that an accident had occurred, to the
knowledge of Mrs. Hill. Any belief that she might have held as to the extent of
the damage could not obliterate that fact, or make it appear that she had reason-
able grounds for believing in a state of facts which, if true, would have consti-
tuted a defence to the charge. The case does not stand in the way of a defence of
reasonable care in a proper case.46
Such a bald assertion is extremely difficult to justify without more, especially
when one considers that the decision has already been given a clear interpre-
39 [1948] 1 D.L.R. 235 at 243, 90 C.C.C. 129 at 137 (Ont. C.A.).
40 As the company dealt in such vast amounts of lobsters and the employees had
been specifically instructed not to deal in undersized lobsters, it would have been
extremely difficult to show lack of diligence. As the majority stated, "If lack of knowl-
edge by any responsible employee constituted a defence for a limited company to a
charge under s. 3(1) (b) of the Regulations, then I think it would in many cases be
virtually impossible to secure a conviction." Pierce Fisheries, supra note 33, at 22
(S.C.R.), 286 (C.R.N.S.).
41 Such an interpretation was taken by, inter alia, the Law Reform Commission of
Canada. See Studies on Strict Liability, supra note 8, at 164.
42 Supra note 33.
43 Ontario Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 202, s. 140(l) (a).
44 Supra note 33.
45 Hill v. The Queen, supra note 33, at 408-09 (S.C.R.), 302 (C.R.N.S.) per
Dickson J.
40 Supra note 7, at 180 (D.L.R.), 372 (C.C.C.).
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tation as imposing absolute liability47 and that Dickson J. delivered the
judgment of the Court in both cases. On this particular point, the sincerity
and integrity of the reasoning employed is seriously challenged.
Also, in its search to find a respectable quantity and quality of authority
to justify the introduction of this middle ground of liability, the Court did
not confine itself solely to the body of Canadian authorities, and felt con-
strained to turn to other Commonwealth jurisdictions. This unnecessary de-
pendence on foreign decisions to bolster and justify its own decision amounts
to the third ground of objection. However, this criticism is aimed not at the
practice of considering the approaches of foreign jurisdictions to similar
problems in Canada, which is profitable and instructive, but at the habit of
utilizing foreign authority purely to give technical validity and support to a
solution favoured by a Canadian court. Such insecurity stands in the way of
a fully matured and individual model of judicial philosophy being developed
by the Supreme Court to fit the needs and special interests of Canada, as
opposed to depending on a largely uncritical distillation of foreign models
of judicial activity. Notwithstanding this, the Court found the most favour-
able encouragement in an established line of antipodean authorities. In Aus-
tralia, building on the initial work done in Maher v. Musson4" and Proudman
v. Dayman,49 the courts have developed the rule that, if it is sufficiently clear
that a statute does not require proof of mens rea, the burden of proof shifts
to the defendant to show, on a balance of probabilities, that there was a
reasonable mistake or that reasonable care had been taken.50 This principle
has also found acceptance in New Zealand.51 Further, the Supreme Court of
Canada looked to developments in England and felt able to record a favour-
able response to the suggestion of a "halfway house." Although the Court
may not have intended it, the impression given is that such an innovation
forms part of English law. Unfortunately, this is not the case, for the reserved
enthusiasm of a small number of law lords in Sweet v. Parsley"2 cannot be
taken to represent the prevailing view of the judicial establishment, and any
reliance by the Court on such patently obiter statements is ill-founded.
Although the Court's reasoning is strained and far from being entirely
satisfactory, there is little to be gained from any protracted discussion of
whether there was a sufficient precedential base on which the Court could
rest its decision. While the Court might traditionally be considered still to
4 7 R. v. Gillis (1974), 8 N.S.R. (2d) 550, 18 C.C.C. (2d) 190 (N.S.S.C., App. Div.).
48 (1934), 52 C.L.R. 100 (Aust. H.C.).
49 (1941), 67 C.L.R. 536 (Aust. H.C.).
50 See, generally, Howard, supra note 6. In a recent report by The Criminal Law
and Penal Methods Reform Committee of South Australia, entitled The Substantive
Criminal Law (1977), it was recommended that negligence as a basis of liability should
be retained in summary offences only; see, generally, at 340-54; and Annot. (1978), 4
C.L.B. 614.
51 R. v. Ewart (1905), 25 N.Z.L.R. 709; and R. v. Strawbridge, [1970] N.Z.L.R.
909. See also Clark, Essays on Criminal Law in New Zealand (Wellington: Sweet &
Maxwell, 1971) at 16.
52 See Lords Reid, Pearce and Diplock in Sweet v. Parsley, [1970] A.C. 132 at 150,
158 and 164 respectively.
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be bound technically by its own earlier decisions,53 it seems to be agreed on
most sides 54 that the Court can and wilP 5 refuse to follow and, if need be,
depart from prior decisions when the appropriate circumstances present them-
selves and compelling considerations of policy so dictate; "although the
Supreme Court's past devotion was to precedent, its future commitment must
surely be to policy." 56 Indeed, the Court itself has emphasized, although in
mostly obiter statements, that it would not be fulfilling its role adequately
as the highest appellate court if it maintained a slavish and mechanical ad-
herence to the doctrine of stare decisis. As Chief Justice Laskin recently noted:
This Court, above all others in this country, cannot be simply mechanistic about
previous decisions, whatever be the respect it would pay to such decisions .... I
do not have to call upon pronouncements of members of this Court that we are
free to depart from previous decisions .... mhis Court has not shown itself to
be timorous in tackling important issues where it could be said, with some justifi-
cation, that an important consideration was absent from an earlier judgment, even
a recent one, upon which reliance was placed to foreclose examination of a simi-
lar issue in a subsequent case. 57
Accordingly, the remainder of this comment will not concern itself with the
fruitless task of determining whether the past record of the Court in dealing
with absolute liability offences enables or justifies the Court in reaching the
decision it did in the present case. It is much more profitable to concentrate
upon the desirability of the decision and its likely implications for and effects
53 Mr. Justice Duff in Stuart v. Bank of Montreal (1909), 41 S.C.R. 516 at 535,
stated unequivocally: "Considerations of public convenience too obvious to require state-
ment ... make it our duty to apply this principle [stare decisis] to the decisions of this
Court." This decision has never been expressly overruled and, as such, remains authorita-
tive on the matter. Stuart was followed in Gale v. Bureau (1911), 44 S.C.R. 305; Grant
v. Scott (1919), 59 S.C.R. 227; Barre v. The King, [1927] S.C.R. 284, [1927] 2 D.L.R.
1097, 48 C.C.C. 91; Soulliere v. Avondale Manor Land Co., [1940] S.C.R. 680, [1940]
4 D.L.R. 145.
54 See, inter alia, Weiler, In the Last Resort (Toronto: Carswell/Methuen, 1974)
at 59; MacGuigan, Precedent and Policy in The Supreme Court (1967), 45 Can. B.
Rev. 627, Coval and Smith, The Supreme Court and a New Jurisprudence for Canada
(1975), 53 Can. B. Rev. 819; Laskin, The Role and Functions of Final Appellate
Courts: The Supreme Court of Canada (1975), 53 Can. B. Rev. 469 at 478; Hogg,
Constitutional Law of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1977) at 99.
Also, in an unpublished address to the University of Saskatchewan, infra note 61,
Mr. Justice Dickson, speaking in a personal capacity, said:
Under a strict rule of stare decisis, judges were duty-bound to search for and
follow existing judicial precedent to govern the cases before them, even though,
as Lord Denning has said that meant: "Stand by your decisions and the decisions
of your predecessors, however wrong they are and whatever injustice they inflict."
At present, most of the supreme courts in the world, including the Supreme Court
of Canada, feel themselves at liberty to reconsider their earlier decisions and
depart from previous doctrine if convinced that that doctrine is plainly wrong.
55 See, inter alia, Brant Dairy Co. v. Milk Comm'n. of Ontario, [1973] S.C.R. 131;
Hill v. The Queen, [1975] 2 S.C.R. 402, 58 D.L.R. (3d) 697, 14 C.C.C. 505; R. v.
Paquette, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 189, 70 D.L.R. (3d) 129; Gov't of Can. v. McNamara Con-
struction Ltd. (1977), 13 N.R. 181 (F.C.A.).
53 MacGuigan, supra note 54, at 665.
57 Harrison v. Carswell, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 200 at 205-06, [1975] 6 W.W.R. 673 at
683. See also R. v. George, [1966] S.C.R. 267 at 278, 55 D.L.R. (2d) 386 at 395, [1966]
3 C.C.C. 137 at 148 per Cartwright J.; and Binus v. The Queen, [1967] S.C.R. 594 at
601, [1968] 1 C.C.C. 227 at 229 per Cartwright J.
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upon the future. One hopes it may result in the more successful structuring
and administering of absolute liability offences.
III. THE DOCTRINE OF MENS REA
The members of the Supreme Court have not been in the habit of making
explicit or articulating the major doctrinal premises on which they rest their
more particularized principles of law. Furthermore, they have seemed not
only indifferent to the need for such exposition, but also positively unwilling
to enter into any discourse on the theoretical generalizations that underpin
and shape their response to individual cases. Consequently, any attempt to
unmask the essential core of jurisprudential assumptions that lies at the heart
of every decision 58 has been, of necessity, one of conjecture and intuitive
supposition. For a court that is becoming increasingly involved in questions
of general policy and values, this state of affairs is to be deplored. However,
in recent years, there are signs59 that the Court has started to overcome some
of its traditional reticence and reluctance in such matters. The Court has
made the first tentative moves in making good its earlier deficiencies °° and has
become more disposed to explicate its crucial theoretical stance on important
doctrinal issues, such as the nature and purpose of the law, the motive forces
and dynamics of judicial decision making, and its own role in the overall legal
and political system. 61 There now seems to be a growing awareness of the
58 As F.S.C. Northrop commented, "in law, as in all other things, we shall find
that the only difference between a person without a philosophy and someone with a
philosophy is that the latter knows what his philosophy is, and is, therefore, more able
to make clear and justify the premises that are implicit in his statement of the facts of
his experience and his judgments about those facts"; The Complexity of Legal and
Ethical Experience (Boston; Little, Brown, 1959) at 6. However, many judges maintain
that it is not part of their function to build up and articulate a coherent philosophy. As
Lord MacMillan opined, "[y]our Lordships' task in this House is to decide particular
cases between litigants and your Lordships are not called on to rationalise the law of
England. That attractive, if perilous, field may well be left to other hands to cultivate";
Read v. J. Lyons & Co., [1947] A.C. 156 at 175, [1946] 2 All E.R. 471 at 478. Also,
Professor Mewitt makes the rather myopic statement that recent academic observations
fail "to recognize that law suits are attempts to resolve disputes between parties by the
submitting of issues to an impartial arbiter. They are not, nor should they be, excuses for
introducing into the realm of law-making mere jurisprudential discussion. See Criminal
Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1978) at 115. For a classic analysis of the approach of the
Supreme Court to the problem of the mental element in criminal law, see Weiler, The
Supreme Court of Canada and the Doctrine of Mens Rea (1971), 49 Can. B. Rev. 280
59 The most striking example of this is the reasoning, if not the actual result, in
Harrison v. Carswell, supra note 57.
60 It is plausible that the pleas of a number of academics might have, at least, en-
couraged such a fresh approach; see Coval and Smith, supra note 54 and Weiler,
supra note 54.
G1 Along with Chief Justice Laskin, Mr. Justice Dickson is in the vanguard of such
a movement. For instance in an unpublished address at the University of Saskatchewan
on May 19, 1978, he expressed some of his personal views on the role of policy in
judicial decision-making. He felt that the Supreme Court was "at the threshold of a new
era of judicial decision-making" in its efforts to balance the conflicting demands of
stability and change. Relieved of pressures created by a strict application of stare decisis,
see supra note 54, he perceived the Court as being "an appropriate forum in which to
pursue social goals .. . and to contribute to the orderly evaluation of society." Although
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need to become more reflective, and there appears to be a greater readiness
to develop a keener and more conscious appreciation of "the policies and
principles embedded beneath the surface of the rules. '62 Although the doc-
trinal and theoretical discussion of the place, if any, of absolute liability in
the general scheme of criminal liability is by no means as full or as extensive
as it might be, the decision in Sault Ste. Marie nevertheless marks a further, if
small, step forward in this incipient and enlightened trend. Whatever other
failings the decision might have, it merits warm praise in this particular
context.
It must be made clear from the outset that the Court restricted its obser-
vations on the concept of absolute liability63 to those offences referred to as
"public welfare" or "regulatory" ones. It does not purport to make any in-
road into or attempt to derogate from the Blackstonian principle that lies at
the core of the criminal law, namely, that "to constitute a crime against
human laws, there must be, first, a vicious will; and secondly, an unlawful act
consequent upon such vicious will."" Accordingly, the thrust of the whole
the Court must not attempt to usurp the function of the legislature, he thought that
there were ample instances in which the Court could adopt such an activist and creative
approach. In particular, he drew attention to the areas of criminal and environmental
law:
In criminal law, there is the renewed concern for individual rights and pro-
tection of privacy in the face of new technological advances on the part of both
those who break the law, and those who are to enforce it. In environmental law,
both large and small-scale, there is great concern to give appropriate weight to
f justice are not destroyed-particularly the principle that punishment
be inflicted on the blameless.
-e guarded and conservative comment by the same writer on the de-
:ial activism, see Dickson, "Comment," in Linden, ed., The Canadian
to: Osgoode Hall Law School, 1976) at 80-84.
FJudges and Scholars: Reflections in a Centennial Year (1975), 53 Can.
64. Indeed, Dickson J. articulated some of his views on the scope and
creativity in Harrison v. Carswell, supra note 57, at 218 (S.C.R.), 678
,ed by Dickson J., "absolute liability entails conviction on proof merely
t committed the prohibited act constituting the actus reus of the offence.
ant mental element. It is no defence that the accused was entirely with-
Ly be morally innocent in every sense, yet be branded as a malefactor
such"; Sault Ste. Marie, supra note 7, at 170 (D.L.R.), 362 (C.C.C.).
and accurate definition is provided by George Fletcher:
lity [is) liability imposed for an act or omission in violation of the law,
)nsidering at trial whether the defendant may exculpate himself by
mistake or accident bearing on the wrongfulness of his violation. The
is that there is a relevant mistake or accident that the court might
.d does not.
inal Law (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978) at 716. At no time did the
ie question of whether, in future, defences such as automatism or duress
the defendant. It is possible that a defendant could be found guilty of
wen though he did not know he was actually doing anything at all.
e, Commentaries on the Laws of England, ed. Christian (15th ed. London:
) at 21.
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decision rests upon a crucial, yet incompletely sketched, distinction being
made between the true criminal offence and the public welfare offence:
[Public welfare offences] are not criminal in any real sense, but are prohibited in
the public interest: Sherras v. De Rutzen, [1895] Q.B. 918. Although enforced as
penal laws through the utilization of the machinery of the criminal law, the of-
fences are in substance of a civil nature and might well be regarded as a branch
of administrative law to which traditional principles of criminal law have but
limited application. They relate to such everyday matters as traffic infractions,
sales of impure food, violations of liquor laws, and the like.05
Even at such an early stage in its discussion, this statement by the Court, as
well as being a very inadequate definition of what amounts to a "public
welfare offence," 00 prompts a substantial criticism of a most rudimentary and
fundamental nature. Although the Court recognizes and claims to rest its
decision on this crucial distinction, it fails to follow through upon the true
significance and implication of such a distinction. If such offences are more
accurately and happily described as civil ones, then nothing can be gained
from attempting to find them a place in the existing framework of the criminal
law. To dress up such offences in the trappings of the modem criminal law is
to exacerbate an already troubled situation. The fact that such offences are
heard in the criminal courts is more a result of historical accident than con-
temporary design. Consequently, the Court must have the courage of its
convictions and treat such offences as sui generis. Ideally, they should be
taken out of the criminal courts and placed in the more suitable environment
of the administrative process.67 Such a decisive move could only be made by
the legislature.
Maintaining this distinction between true crimes and public welfare
offences, and yet, at the same time, striving to fit such offences, in a neat and
compatible manner, within the structure of criminal liability, the Court pro-
ceeded to a consideration of the various competing interests and values at play
in the area of "public welfare offences":
Public welfare offences obviously lie in a field of conflicting values. It is essential
for society to maintain, through effective enforcement, high standards of public
health and safety. Potential victims of those who carry on latently pernicious
activities have a strong claim to consideration. On the other hand, there is a
generally held revulsion against punishment of the morally innocent.
Public welfare offences evolved in mid-19th century Britain (R. v. Woodrow
(1846), 15 M. & W. 404, 153 E.R. 907, and R. v. Stephens (1866), L.R. 1 Q.B.
65 Supra note 7, at 165 (D.L.R.), 357 (C.C.C.).
06 For a comprehensive discussion, see Starrs, "The Regulatory Offence in Histori-
cal Perspective" in Mueller, ed., Essays in Criminal Science (London: Sweet & Maxwell,
1961); Morris and Howard, Studies in Criminal Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964)
at 200; Sayre, Public Welfare Offences (1933), 33 Colum. L. Rev. 55; Perkins, The
Civil Offense (1952), 100 U. Pa. L. Rev. 832; Paulus, Strict Liability: Its Place in
Public Welfare Offences (1978), 20 Crim. L.Q. 445.
67 Such an approach has been taken by the American Law Institute in its Model
Penal Code. It feels that such offences should be dealt with on the same footing as civil
offences and be punishable with only a fine, forfeiture or other civil penalty. Moreover,
such a transfer could actually result in increased prevention because the offender would
be liable to have his business closed or his licence revoked-a much more effective
sanction that he would be unable to write off as a business expense: see Sayre, id.;
Perkins, id.; Ginossar, Autonomy of Corrective Law (1974), 9 Israel L. Rev. 24.
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702) as a means of doing away with the requirement of mens rea for petty
police offences. The concept was a judicial creation, founded on expediency. That
concept is now firmly embedded in the concrete of Anglo-American and Canadianjurisprudence, its importance heightened by the ever-increasing complexities of
modern society. 68
The reasons and rationale used to justify the imposition of absolute
liability in such offences have been fully rehearsed. There are two main
strands in these arguments: greater administrative efficiency and improved
standards of prevention. It is argued that as the likelihood and extent of risk
to social and public interests increase, so the need for mens rea decreases.
The interests of society take legitimate precedence over those of the indivi-
dual: "[J]ustice to the individual is rightly outweighed by the larger interests
on the other side of the scales." 69 If, for instance, a corporation voluntarily
engages in an activity that puts the community at risk, then the corporation
should be liable for any harm that ensues and must accept the possibility of
the consequences turning out worse than they expected. In this way, the
entrepreneur becomes the compulsory and comprehensive insurer of the
public against the risk created. 70 Such a state of affairs, it is argued, will create
a great incentive to take all conceivable preventative steps. Also, it would
deter all but the most competent from engaging in such potentially hazardous
activities. The central force of such arguments is well brought out by Paul
Weiler:
Public welfare offences regulate conduct that is a considerable distance removed
from any harm to any individual, and thus the retributive urges in the area are
muted. The conduct is prohibited by laws of relatively recent origin and there is
a relatively artificial line between illegal behaviour and legitimate business deal-
ings. Hence, there is much less of an aura of popular moral attitudes surrounding
the offence and little likelihood of public stigma in a conviction. This is reflected
in the fact that the almost invariable sentence for the offence will be a fine im-
posed on the firm, not a jail sentence on an individual. The firm has chosen to
engage in business where these regulatory laws apply. It can be required to treat
the amount of these fines as a cost of doing business and made to adjust its affairs
accordingly. 71
The second strand of the justificatory rationale for absolute liability is
that of greater administrative efficiency. It is argued that the cost, difficulty
and inconvenience of having the Crown prove mens rea would unduly hamper
the efficient administration of the courts and heap an unnecessary amount of
work on an already overworked court system. In short, the imposition of
absolute liability responds to the system's growing concern for the spiralling
costs of procedure in cases where it is too expensive, or even impossible, to
prove fault, considering the gravity of harm involved. The potential cost of
litigation is accorded greater weight than a possible wrong conviction. On
OS Supra note 7, at 170-71 (D.L.R.), 363 (C.C.C.).
69 Holmes, The Common Law, ed. Howe (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963) at 41.
70 See Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law (London: Stevens, 1978) at 905.
71 Supra note 54, at 100. A similar sentiment is expressed by Freund:
IThe problem of responsibility is not the general social phenomenon of moral
delinquency and guilt, but the practical problem of dealing with physical condi-
tions and social or economic practices that are to be controlled.
Legislative Regulation (New York: The Commonwealth Fund, 1932) at 253.
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such a view, the relationship between the substance of crimes and the proce-
dural context in which they operate is much deeper and of a more intimate
nature than is often admitted. 72 As Professor Sayre declared:
It is needless to point out that, swamped with such appalling inundations of
cases of petty violations, the lower criminal courts would be physically unable to
examine the subjective intent of each defendant, even were such determination
desirable. As a matter of fact it is not; for the penalty in such cases is so slight
that the courts can afford to disregard the individual in protecting the social
interest.73
The main thrust, therefore, of such justificatory arguments is that a brand of
philosophical calculus must be applied and a decision made as to whether
the interests and protection of society outweigh the interests and possible
injustice to one individual member of that society:
In short, absolute liability, it is contended, is the most efficient and effective way
of ensuring compliance with minor regulatory legislation and the social ends to
be achieved are of such importance as to override the unfortunate by-product of
punishing those who may be free of moral turpitude. In further justification, it is
urged that slight penalties are usually imposed and that conviction for breach of
a public welfare offence does not carry the stigma associated with conviction for
a criminal offence.74
Although respecting and sympathizing with such sentiments, the Court
was not persuaded and felt that "arguments of greater force are advanced
against absolute liability.175 In effect, these arguments are quite simply the
other side of the coin, and they directly challenge the validity of the argu-
ments used to support the imposition of absolute liability. First, the Court
maintained that, in spite of the weighty and unignorable interest of society,
absolute liability too greatly eroded and cut into the fundamental principles
of criminal liability. The price of absolute liability is too high and is bought
at too great a cost to individual liberty and freedom. The identity and per-
sonality of the individual becomes unduly submerged beneath the rising tide
of impersonal and aggregate interests. As George Fletcher delightfully re-
marks, "the utilitarian calculus is too commodious a crucible for resolving
concrete problems of mistakes of law."'70
A more substantive and practical argument employed against the imposi-
tion of absolute liability is that it could well prove to be counter-productive
and actually increase cynicism and disrespect for law. There is and can be no
empirical demonstration of the claim that absolute liability will result in
greater care being taken. Indeed, the opposite is likely. If a trading concern
is punished regardless of fault, it will soon come to regard fines as an unavoid-
able loss and will simply write them off as a necessary and routine part of
72 Indeed, as Professor Packer notes, "[t]he problems of administration are in-
separable from the problem of what is or ought to be the substance of what is being
administered. Indeed, the character of the processes of criminal justice is formed by the
substantive tasks allotted to them." The Model Penal Code and Beyond (1963), 63
Colum. L. Rev. 594 at 604.
73 Supra note 66, at 69-70.
74 R. v. Sault Ste. Marie, supra note 7, at 171 (D.L.R.), 363 (C.C.C.).
75 Id.
76 Fletcher, supra note 63, at 733.
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business expenditure. 77 In such circumstances, the incentive to lay out money
and time to prevent pollution or to encourage research into the technology of
pollution prevention will be reduced.78 Such an unhealthy situation, created
by the imposition of no-fault liability, is more than likely to lead to a serious
and crippling reduction in the law's success as a preventive and inspirational
force.7
9
Finally, the Court remained unconvinced by arguments based on greater
administrative efficiency. Undesirous of elevating administrative efficiency
above wider considerations of justice and due process, the Court did not feel
constrained to attach much importance to such arguments:
The administrative argument has little force. In sentencing, evidence of due dili-
gence is admissible and therefore the evidence might just as well be heard when
considering guilt. Additionally, it may be noted that s. 198 of the Alberta High-
way Traffic Act, R.S.A. 1970, c. 169, provides that upon a person being charged
77 See Williams, supra note 70, at 907-08.
78 An application of the presently favoured "economic perspective," as represented
by Richard A. Posner and other members of the so-called Chicago School, to the prob-
lem offers some interesting insights into the relative efficiency and efficacy of strict
liability and negligence as methods of combating the type of harm and safeguarding the
interests that public welfare offences are intended to protect. According to such an analy-
sis, where the primary object of an offence is accident prevention, as is the case with
public welfare offences, there is little to choose between strict liability and negligence.
Whichever basis of liability is employed, the standard of care taken by the potential
injurer is likely to be influenced almost exclusively by the result of balancing the cost
of precautions against the predicted cost of the penalty. If the preventive costs are lower,
then precautions will be taken whether the offence is one of negligence or strict liability.
But if the penalty is lower, then neither negligence nor strict liability is likely to encour-
age the taking of precautions. Therefore, the choice of liability standards has no effect
on the level of safety achieved. Moreover, it is possible, yet surprising to many, that, if
either basis of liability is to bring about some long term effect, the imposition of strict
liability is more likely than negligence to result in an improvement in accident preven-
tion. As regards negligence, liability is usually determined on the existing state of sophis-
tication of the technology of accident prevention and, as such, presents little or no
incentive to advance such knowledge by investing in its research and development. On
the other hand, strict liability may engender greater safety, as there is more of an incen-
tive to encourage and engage in the research into and the development of precautionary
measures:
If [defendants] were liable for all accidents . . . . it would compare the liability
that it could not avoid by means of existing safety precautions with the feasibility
of developing new precautions that would reduce that liability. If safety research
and development seemed likely to reduce accident costs by more than the cost
of research and development, the [defendant] would undertake it ....
Posner, The Economic Analysis of Law (2d ed. Boston: Little, Brown, 1977) at 138.
See, generally, Posner, A Theory of Negligence (1972), 1 J. Leg. Stud. 29; Posner,
Strict Liability: A Comment (1973), 2 J. Leg. Stud. 205; and Brown, Toward an Eco-
nomic Theory of Liability (1973), 2 J. Leg. Stud. 323.
Such an approach is overly simplistic. The validity of the argument is contingent
on two dubious assumptions: that penalties will remain minimal and unrealistic, and
that the intangible costs (i.e., loss of reputation in the community, political embarrass-
ment, unsettling of shareholders) will be negligible. Moreover, it fails to take into
account the possible and positive gains that are available if the polluter shows himself to
be a morally and socially responsible member of the community. There is much more
to law and life than the cold and relentless logic of economic reasoning.
79 See Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing
Economic Regulations (1963), 30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 423 at 440-44.
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with an offence under this Act, if the Judge trying the case is of the opinion that
the offence (a) was committed wholly by accident or misadventure and without
negligence, and (b) could not by the exercise of reasonable care or precaution
have been avoided, the Judge may dismiss the case. See also, s. 230(2) [am.
1976, c. 62, s. 48] of the Manitoba Highway Traffic Act, R.S.M. 1970, c. H60,
which has a similar effect. In these instances at least, the Legislature has indicated
that administrative efficiency does not foreclose inquiry as to fault. It is also
worthy of note that historically the penalty for breach of statutes enacted for the
regulation of individual conduct in the interests of health and safety was minor,
$20 or $25; today, it may amount to thousands of dollars and entail the possi-
bility of imprisonment for a second conviction. 80
In rejecting the theoretical basis for absolute liability, the Court empha-
sized, however, that this did not mean that they automatically embraced the
idea that full mens rea must be an indispensable element of every offence.
It would, in both practice and theory, be ill-advised to reach such a conclu-
sion. Consequently, the possibility of some middle ground being taken pre-
sented itself as an attractive and appropriate solution to the problem. Further-
more, by plotting such a course, the Court was able to accord sufficient weight
and importance to the promotion of public health and safety, and, at the
same time, devise some method to encompass the "thoughtless and ineffi-
cient"8' without snaring the diligent and socially responsible. In arriving at
such a conclusion, the Court deserves to be warmly applauded and the results
of its discussion can be willingly approved and endorsed. Yet this does not
complete the work of the Court. There still remains the considerable problem
of giving substance to and delineating the exact boundaries of this freshly
inhabited middle ground.
Before proceeding to inspect this newly developed "halfway house" of
liability, it is worthwhile to take a brief glance at a problem that caused the
Court some momentary concern, a problem that touches upon the difficult
question of the precise role of the Supreme Court in the overall law-making
process. Their uncertainty concerned the issue of whether the introduction of
some middle ground fell more correctly into the sphere of legislative enact-
ment rather than within the scope of judicial action. In short, was the judiciary
encroaching upon a legitimate area of control and responsibility of the repre-
sentative arm of the legal system? Although the response of the Court to this
dilemma is likely to receive general approval, the rationale relied upon by
the Court is not entirely convincing or adequate, especially when seen in the
light of the more cogent and sophisticated arguments at its disposal:
It may be suggested that the introduction of a defence based on due diligence and
the shifting of the burden of proof might better be implemented by legislative act.
In answer, it should be recalled that the concept of absolute liability and the crea-
tion of a jural category of public welfare offences are both the product of thejudiciary and not of the Legislature. The development to date of this defence, in
the numerous decisions I have referred to, of Courts in this country as well as in
Australia and New Zealand, has also been the work of Judges. The present case
offers the opportunity of consolidating and clarifying the doctrine.82
While it is the responsibility of the legislature to devise and decide upon
8 0 R. v. Sault Ste. Marie, supra note 7, at 172 (D.L.R.), 364 (C.C.C.).
81 Pound, Spirit of the Common Law (Boston: Marshall Jones, 1921) at 52,
82 R. v. Sault Ste. Marie, supra note 7, at 181 (D.L.R.), 373 (CC.C.).
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a scheme of policy suited to the demands of the particular society at any given
time, it is the job of the courts to fit such a scheme into the existing legal
framework and to ensure a smooth and fair application of such policy in the
individual case. 83 This is especially so in the field of criminal law where all
offences must be created by the legislature. However, legislative policies are
generally enacted on the assumption that the traditionally formulated rules
relating to individual responsibility and general defences will apply. Accord-
ingly, it seems reasonable to suggest that the creative development of these
underlying rules is best suited to the judicial rather than the legislative insti-
tutions of the legal system. Yet this does not mean that the courts can go
about this process in a completely unfettered manner and without taking due
note of the direction that the legislature is taking in policy matters. Paul
Weiler captures the essential character of the problem to be faced, particu-
larly by the Supreme Court:
Even if we are not overly concerned with the absolute restraints of judicial pre-
cedent, the court must respect the legislative will when the latter has spoken. To
some extent, statutory language usually enacted on the basis of a nineteenth
century perception of the mens rea problem, may have frozen the process of
development and artificially precluded the judicial creation of a coherent and
rational body of law in the area. Hence the Supreme Court is continually faced
here with a delicate question in the theory of statutory interpretation-how clear
a statement it would require from a legislature before acquiescing in a departure
from the basic legal principle which animates the whole area of law, both statu-
tory and judge-made. 84
Nevertheless, to reduce all the problems in this area to the one problem of
statutory interpretation is to oversimplify the situation. The process of sta-
tutory interpretation is by no means a purely mechanical or value-free opera-
tion. It is impregnated with a host of value-based and result-oriented devices,
as the resolution of the present case reveals 85
IV. THE HALFWAY HOUSE
Before making any critical comments upon this via media between full
mens rea and absolute liability that the Court chose to follow, it is vital that
the way in which this new category of liability will work should be clearly
understood. First, the Crown must prove the actus reus of the offence to the
satisfaction of the court, that is, beyond reasonable doubt. If the Crown is
able to do this, two possible courses of action may follow:
A. If the defendant chooses to remain silent or does not wish to put any
evidence before the court,8 it will be assumed that he acted without
due diligence and a conviction will be registered. There is no onus
upon the Crown to prove that the defendant acted negligently; or
8 3 See Weiler, Two Models of Judicial Decision-making (1968), 46 Can. B. Rev.
406; and Weiler, Legal Values and Judicial Decision-making (1970), 48 Can. B. Rev. 1.
84 Weiler, supra note 58, at 284.
85 See text accompanying notes 141 and 142, infra.
80 It is feasible that such evidence may be present or, at least, implied in the Crown's
presentation of its case.
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B. The defendant may adduce evidence to show that he was not negli-
gent, but, on the contrary, acted with all due diligence. The burden
of proving such an issue lies on the defendant. This is commonly
referred to as "a reversed onus of proof",8 7 whereby the defendant
must show on a balance of probabilities that he acted with due
diligence rather than in a negligent manner.
It must be remembered, and is of paramount importance, that if, at the end
of the day, the defendant is unable to show that it is more likely than not
that he acted with due diligence, then the court must decide in favour of
the Crown and a conviction is to be registered. This middle ground of liability,
therefore, rests upon two central pillars: an available defence of due diligence
and a shifting of the burden of proof. In effect, the Court endorsed and gave
legal force to the recommendations of the Law Reform Commission of
Canada: 88
The correct approach is to relieve the Crown of the burden of proving mens
rea .... It is not up to the prosecution to prove negligence. Instead, it is open
to the defendant to prove that all due care has been taken. This burden falls
upon the defendant as he is the only one who will generally have the means of
proof. This would not seem unfair as the alternative is absolute liability which
denies an accused any defence whatsoever while the prosecution must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the prohibited act, the
defendant must only establish on the balance of probabilities that he has a de-
fence of reasonable care.80
The introduction of a defence of reasonable care, thereby creating an
offence of negligence, is of great theoretical significance. It effects a move in
the basis of liability from the traditional view of punishing only fault-based
activities to the essentially different ground of imposing criminal sanctions for
merely negligent behaviour. Indeed, it is a moot point whether negligence can
be legitimately classified as a species of mens rea.0 Notwithstanding this
point of some philosophical nicety, the Court seemed satisfied to extend
liability based on negligence to public welfare offences. However, although
87 Although not all "reverse onus" provisions require proof on a balance of probabi-
lities, such a label has been generally affixed to a burden and quantum of proof of this
nature: see Cross, Evidence (4th ed. London: Butterworths, 1974) at 73-88, esp. at 80;
Phipson, On Evidence, ed. Buzzard, et al. (12th ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1976)
at 36-47; Schiff, Evidence in the Litigation Process (Toronto: Carswell, 1978) at 1077-
1111.
88 Can., Our Criminal Law (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1976), endorsing an
earlier working paper, Can., The Meaning of Guilt (Ottawa: Information Canada,
1974).
89 R. v. Sault Ste. Marie, supra note 7, at 181 (D.L.R.), 373 (C.C.C.).
90 See Hart, "Negligence, Mens Rea and Criminal Responsibility," in Punishment
and Responsibility; Essays in the Philosophy of Law (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1968) at 136; Edwards, Mens Rea in Statutory Offences (London: Macmillan,
1955) at 205; Edgerton, Negligence, Inadvertence and Indifference: The Relation of
Mental State to Negligence (1926), 39 Harv. L. Rev. 849; Salmond, Jurisprudence, ed.
Williams (11th ed. London: Stevens, 1957) at 474-84; Hall, General Principles of Cri-
minal Law (2d ed. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1960) at 136; Fletcher, The Theory of
Criminal Negligence: A Comparative Analysis (1971), 119 U. Pa. L. Rev. 401; and
Karlen, Mens Rea: A New Analysis (1978), 9 U. Tol. L. Rev. 191.
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such liability is a common feature of much statute law,91 it remains pertinent
to ask the extent to which negligence is a suitable standard of conduct to
control such activities.
One of the problems involved in the introduction of a defence based on
negligence is the difficulty inherent in applying a test based on reasonable-
ness. In short, it resurrects the perennial debate over the suitability and de-
sirability of objective or subjective standards. 9 2 While objective liability may
result in injustice in specific instances, subjective liability is impolitic and is
likely to lead to a less responsible and reflective attitude being taken by the
individual, thereby taking away the spur to maintain and improve the quality
of care taken.93 For instance, while an external and impersonal standard may
be appropriate and fitting in the case of a large corporate conglomerate or
municipality, it may work harsh injustice on the defendant who has less
knowledge and foresight than the reasonable man. As Jobson remarked with
mock profundity, "the company can hire men of foresight: the naturally dull
citizen is stuck with God's endowment. ' 94 Indeed, any balanced scheme of
liability must be concerned about not only whether an individual reached the
standard of the reasonable man, but also whether he ever had the capacity
to do so. 95 In the converse situation, it would seem eminently fair to expect
and demand that the large company take extra-special precautions, if one
considers the vast resources and knowledge at its disposal.9 6 Moreover, the
fact that a company voluntarily enters into a profit-making enterprise that
puts social interests at serious risk surely means that it should bear a level of
responsibility and accountability commensurate to that risk. Unfortunately,
the courts have not warmed to the idea of a variable standard of negligence
and, in Sault Ste. Marie, the Court did not concern itself with the matter, but
91 Aeronautics Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. A-3, s. 17; Canada Dairy Commission Act,
R.S.C. 1970, c. C-7, s. 21(3); Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-2, s. 49; Defence
Production Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. D-2, ss. 21(5), 22; Estate Tax Act, R.S.C. 1970, c.
E-9, s. 50(3); Export and Import Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. E-17, ss. 20,21; Fresh Water Fish
Marketing Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. F-13, s. 30(2);Oil and Gas Production and Conservation
Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 0-4, s. 52; Pest Control Products Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. P-10, s.
10(2); Pesticide Compensation Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. P-11, s. 9(2); Plant Quarantine Act,
R.S.C. 1970, c. P-13, s. 10(2); Proprietary or Patent Medicine Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. P-25,
s. 17(1); Canada Shipping Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. S-9, s. 657; Arctic Waters Pollution Preven-
tion Act, R.S.C. 1970 (1st Supp.), c. 2, s. 20(1); Canada Waters Act, R.S.C. 1970 (1st
Supp.), c. 5, s. 31; Motor Vehicle Safety Act, R.S.C. 1970 (Ist Supp.), c. 26, s. 18(1);
Northern Inland Waters Act, R.S.C. 1970 (1st Supp.), c. 28, s. 35; Radiation Emitting
Devices Act, R.S.C. 1970 (1st Supp.), c. 34, s. 13(1); Saltfish Act, R.S.C. 1970 (1st Supp.),
c. 37, s. 29(2); Textile Labelling Act, R.S.C. 1970 (Ist Supp.), c. 46, s. 13(1); Clean Air
Act, R.S.C. 1970 (Ist Supp.), c. 47, s. 36; Farm Products Marketing Agencies Act, S.C.
1970-71-72, c. 65, s. 38(2); Consumer Packaging and Labelling Act, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 41,
s. 21(1); Food and Drugs Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. F-27, s. 29(1) (b).
From Studies on Strict Liability, supra note 8, at 247.
92 Elliott, Degrees of Negligence (1933), 6 So. Cal. L. Rev. 91; and Seavey, Negli-
gence-Subjective or Objective? (1927), 41 Harv. L. Rev. 1.
93 See Studies on Strict Liability, supra note 8, at 225-28.
04 Supra note 31, at 308-09.
95 See Hart, supra note 90, at 136.
96 See supra note 90.
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was content to state that the test would be "what a reasonable man would
have done in the circumstances. '0 7
The other central support of this defence of due diligence is the placing
of a legal burden on the defendant to prove his lack of negligence on a balance
of probabilities. Although this particular innovation seems the most satis-
factory of a number of options, there lingers a strong feeling that the reason-
ing used to arrive at such a solution could be much tighter and that some of
this reasoning was the product of a dubious approach to previous judicial
pronouncements. The Court realized quite rightly that the classic statement of
Viscount Sankey L.C. in Woolmington v. DPP98 was a likely obstacle to
the implementation of its proposals and had, in fact, been the reef on which
earlier proposals for a "halfway house" had foundered: 9
Throughout the web of English criminal law one golden thread is always to be
seen, that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the prisoner's guilt subject
to the defence of insanity and subject also to any statutory exception .... No
matter what the charge or where the trial, the principle that the prosecution must
prove the guilt of the prisoner is part of the common law of England and no
attempt to whittle it down can be entertained.' 00
In an attempt to obviate this stumbling block, described as "universally
accepted in this country,"'101 the Court seemed hesitant as to whether the
principle actually applied to public welfare offences or not. If it had remained
at all consistent in its arguments, it would have recognized that this "golden
thread" was only intended to govern that category of offences characterized
by the Court as "true crimes.' 02 It is difficult to imagine that Viscount Sankey
intended or even put his mind to considering whether such a rule would apply
to basically regulatory offences. Also, the Court did not take advantage of
the constitutionally sanctioned rule that for a provincial statute (and this is
what the bulk of public welfare offences are) to be valid, it cannot purport to
create an offence that is truly criminal in character. 10 3 Moreover, such an
error is compounded when one realizes that the Court resorted to this very
same rule to justify and clarify its proposed method and scheme for classifying
various offences under different heads of liability. 0 4 Ignoring these valid argu-
ments for making the "golden thread" inapplicable to public welfare offences,
the Court embarked upon a series of tortuous manoeuvres to make a valid,
yet basically unsound, interpretation of the decision in Woolmington.
97 Supra note 7, at 181 (D.L.R.), 374 (C.C.C.).
98 [19351 A.C. 462 (H.L.).
09 See Warner v. Metropolitan Police Comm'r, [1969] 2 A.C. 256 at 303, 52 Cr. App.
R. 373 (H.L.) at 423-24 per Lord Pearce; Sweet v. Parsley, supra note 52, at 150 and 158
per Lords Reid and Pearce; Roper v. Taylor's Central Garages (Exeter), [1951] 2 T.L.R.
284 (D.C.) at 288 per Devlin J; and Lim Chin Aik v. The Queen, [1963] A.C. 160 at
173 (P.C.) per Lord Evershed.
100 Woolmington v. DPP, supra note 98, at 481-82.
101 R. v. Sault Ste. Marie, supra note 7, at 174 (D.L.R.), 367 (C.C.C.).
10 2 See text accompanying note 63, supra.
103 Under the British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, s. 91(27)
(U.K.), the federal government has exclusive legislative authority over "[tihe Criminal
Law ... including the Procedure in Criminal Matters."
104 See text accompanying note 135, infra.
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The underlying sentiment of the Court towards the "golden thread" of
Woolmington is that it would be cruelly ironic if that case, "which embodies
a principle for the benefit of the accused, should be used to justify the rejec-
tion of a defence of reasonable care for public welfare offences and the reten-
tion of absolute liability, which affords the accused no defence at all."'105
Although such a view is appealing, it does not excuse the transparent and
feeble efforts to emasculate the classic statement of Viscount Sankey. The
Court looked to the liberal interpretation of Lord Diplock in Sweet v. Pars-
ley,'00 where he states that Woolmington "did not decide anything so irra-
tional as the prosecution must call evidence to prove the absence of any
mistaken belief by the accused .... The jury is entitled to presume that the
accused acted with knowledge of the facts, unless there is some evidence to
the contrary originating from the accused.' 0 r7 From such a statement, the
Court drew the unwarranted conclusion that Lord Diplock was in fact advo-
cating a shifting of the legal burden of proof from the Crown to the defendant
or, at the very least, that such an interpretation of Woolmington was com-
patible with such a move. Lord Diplock is suggesting no such thing. He is
simply recommending that, in certain circumstances, the defendant may have
an evidential burden; that is, he must raise sufficient evidence to put the issue
in reasonable doubt. He did not derogate from the accepted view that if, at
the end of the day, there is a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the defendant,
he must be acquitted. Moreover, if the Court had made a more thorough
analysis of Lord Diplock's opinion, it would have found that Diplock went
on to say that:
Unlike the position where a statute expressly places the onus of proving lack of
guilty knowledge on the accused, the accused does not have to prove the existence
of mistaken belief on the balance of probabilities; he has to raise a reasonable
doubt as to its non-existence o108
This unnecessary and ill-conceived exercise by the Court merely invites harsh
criticism and plays into the hands of the opponents of a creative and socially
responsive Supreme Court of Canada.
In favouring such an interpretation of Woolmington, the Court is guilty
of taking that dichotomous view in matters of onus and quantum of proof it
so boldly criticized and warned against in the traditional approach to criminal
liability. There is a wide spectrum of possibilities between having no respon-
sibility to adduce evidence and having a full legal burden of proof.109 Indeed,
105 R. v. Sault Ste. Marie, supra note 7, at 175 (D.L.R.), 367 (C.C.C.).
10 Supra note 52.
107 Id. at 164.
108 Id. This completes the circle of confusion. Although Dickson J. misinterprets the
reasoning of Lord Diplock, Lord Diplock himself is guilty of building his own arguments
on a misinterpretation of the decision in Proudinan v. Dayman, supra note 49. The
Australian case imposed a legal burden on the defendant and not, as Lord Diplock be-
lieved, a merely evidential burden.
109 See Cross, supra note 87, at 73-81; and Phipson, supra note 87, at 36-51. This
ignorance on the part of the Supreme Court is doubly surprising when one considers
that the distinctions between the different burdens were recognized as early as 1926;
see Ontario Equitable Life and Accident Ins. Co. v. Baker, [1926] S.C.R. 297, [1926]
2 D.L.R. 289.
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the English approach, as represented by a recent Law Commission Report110
and the opinion of an influential body of lawyers, including practitioners and
academics,"' is that a purely evidential burden should be placed upon the
defendant; that is, "once the prosecution have proved the actus retis, the
triers of fact may infer negligence in the defendant in the absence of any
evidence to the contrary which arises whether from the prosecution's case or
from any evidence given by or on behalf of the defendant."' 12 The main
thrust of their arguments is that to do otherwise would mean that, in the event
of the evidence being evenly balanced, the defendant would have to be con-
victed. Also, bearing in mind the much flaunted and revered principles of
criminal fault, such a state of affairs would scuttle the courts' express intention
to protect the morally blameless and place an unduly onerous burden upon
them. Furthermore, according to such a view, the transfer of the legal burden
of proof is a matter for the legislature to effect by a clear and unequivocal
statement of intent. Accordingly, the Law Commission has drafted a Bill
which is designed to introduce a number of fundamental statutory presump-
tions and put an end to any ambiguity in this particularly treacherous area
of law."11
110 Great Britain, Law Commission, Criminal Law: Report on the Mental Element
in Crime (Cmnd. 89, 1978).
111 See, inter alia, Dean, Negative Averments and the Burden of Proof, [1966]
Crim. L.R. 594; Case and Comment, R. v. Edwards, [1974] Crim L.R. 540; Williams,
The Evidential Burden: Some Common Misapprehensions (1977), 127 N.L.J. 156;
Williams, Evidential Burdens on the Defence (1977), 127 N.L.J. 182; and Ashworth,
A Thread bare Principle, [1978] Crim. L.R. 385.
112 Great Britain, Law Commission, Codification of the Criminal Law; General
Principles; The Mental Element in Crime, Second Programme, Item xviii, Working
Paper no. 31 (London: 1970) at 19.
113 Id. The recommendations of the Report on this matter may be summarized as
follows:
(1) In respect of an offence which is created by a provision in or under a statute
passed on or after the appointed day, it should be expressly stated to what
extent liability depends on intention, knowledge or recklessness, depends on
an objective standard of conduct (whether expressed as liability for negligence
or in some other way) or is intended to be strict.
(2) Wherever, in respect of any requirement of an offence which is created by a
provision in or under a statute passed on or after the appointed day, there
is no provision
(a) making liability strict, or
(b) making liability depend on
(i) the presence or absence of any particular state of mind or
(ii) compliance with an objective standard or conduct,
then, to the extent that no such provision is made, the offence should involve
on the part of the defendant intention or recklessness in relation to any result
and knowledge or recklessness in relation to any circumstance,
(3) (a) Wherever, in respect of an offence which is created by a provision in
or under a statute passed on or after the appointed day, liability is subject
to a defence or exception which does not amount to a provision making
liability depend on
(i) the presence or absence of any particular state of mind or
(ii) compliance with an objective standard of conduct,
then, the defendant should not be liable if, when the conduct required for the
commission of the offence occurred, he believed that any circumstance existed
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In this instance, the Supreme Court was wise not to follow the solution
adopted by its English counterparts. It chose to ignore the English pre-
occupation with purely legalistic arguments based on a strict positivistic out-
look. Instead, it settled on a decision that responded to the actual and live
problems facing the Court and made a genuine attempt to satisfy and reconcile
the cogent demands of the manifold conflicting values and interests at work
in this area. In striving to fulfil such a commendable objective, some of the
arguments of the Court can be viewed in a much more favourable light. Con-
sequently, the Court was motivated by the strong belief that any improvement
is better than the present widespread existence of offences of absolute liability.
It held that there were at least two reasons justifying such an assertion. First,
it will usually be the case that the only people who know whether the defen-
dants have acted diligently are the defendants themselves, since only they
know what actually goes on at their business places. To ask the Crown to
prove such facts would place too onerous a duty on them and would, further,
result in the needless weakening of the enforcement of public welfare legisla-
tion. However, it has to be admitted that such a justification is rather brittle,
as this objection could be raised in almost any matter on the question of
mnens rea. Second, by placing such a burden on the defendant, it ensures that
the important social interests at play are sufficiently recognized and protected,
while, at the same time, it does permit the innocent defendant the opportunity
to prove his blamelessness. It must be remembered that if, at the end of the
day, the evidence is evenly balanced, a conviction will be recorded.
V. METHOD OF CATEGORIZATION
It is, of course, an established and entrenched principle of Canadian
common law that "it is of utmost importance for the protection of the liberty
of the subject that a court should always bear in mind that, unless a statute
which, had it in fact existed, would have provided him with the defence or
the exception from liability.
The Report has already been subject to strong scrutiny and critical comment. For in-
stance, Hogan comments that "[i]t may be deduced from this Report and from its
Working Papers that the Law Commission favours liability based on fault (including
negligence) and is against the imposition of liability without fault, but there is nowhere
in the Report a firm and clear statement of principle, nor is Parliament offered any
guidance." Moreover, he goes on to say that the Report's failure to suggest a scheme by
which to determine whether an offence is regulatory or is a true crime is inexcusable:
"[p]erhaps I am expecting too much of the Law Commission but I envisaged it as an
architect of new law, not a jobbing builder to the old." Finally, he closes with a general
observation that touches on the Canadian predicament:
The problem, of course, goes much further than the substitution of liability based
on fault (including negligence) for strict liability though, at the very least, a man
ought not to be accounted criminal if he has taken all reasonable care to conform
to the law's demands. It is pertinent to ask whether and when the imposition of
criminal liability for merely negligent behaviour is proper and profitable. The
suggestion that the substitution of liability based on negligence for strict liability-
the so-called halfway house-will solve the problem I find altogether too facile.
• ..Stupidity does not seem to me to be an adequate basis for offences which
society regards very seriously. Once the man has been convicted, will it not be
assumed on all sides that the offence was the result of deliberation rather than
thoughtlessness?
Strict Liability, [1978] Crim. L. Rev. 593-98.
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either clearly or by necessary implication rules out mens rea as a constituent
part of a crime, the court shall not find a man guilty of an offence against
the criminal law unless he has a guilty mind." 1 4 Accordingly, any deviation
from this cardinal presumption will require the force of legislative enactment,
and such an enactment will have to be expressed in the most clear and un-
equivocal terms. It is essential, therefore, that if the courts intend to interfere
with or whittle down this principle, there must be extremely cogent and per-
suasive reasons for doing so. Up to the present decision, the problem had,
generally, been one of deciding whether such a presumption had been rebut-
ted or not. While on the face of it this might appear a simple task, a brief
glance at the case law that has grown up on the subject reveals otherwise. 11
Moreover, the task has taken on an even more hazardous and difficult com-
plexion for there are now three possible categories of liability as compared
to the previous two. Even if it is possible to determine successfully whether
the initial presumption has been rebutted, it still remains to decide the second
and equally difficult problem; namely, into which of the other two categories
does it fall? Unfortunately, if the amount of time and discussion devoted to
this issue is anything by which to judge, the Court has sorely underestimated
or unwisely decided to play down the difficulty and importance to be attached
to providing an accurate and reliable guide with which to complete such a
task. Although it has to be recognized that the Court is struggling against a
state of affairs that is the product of legislative as well as judicial mismanage-
ment, the Court must take its share of responsibility for the debilitating effect
that uncertainty will have upon this crucial aspect of the law. Moreover, the
ramifications of the method of categorization devised by the Court will pos-
sibly be much more far-reaching than it actually intended, especially as re-
gards certain offences which previously required full mens rea.
The Court offered an initially attractive and crisp general formula to be
used in determining into which category a particular offence should fall:
Offences which are criminal in the true sense fall in the first category. Public
welfare offences would, prima facie, be in the second category. They are not
subject to the presumption of full mens rea. An offence of this type would fall
in the first category only if such words as "wilfully", "with intent", "knowingly"
or "intentionally" are contained in the statutory provision creating the offence.
On the other hand, the principle that punishment should not in general be in-
flicted on those without fault applies. Offences of absolute liability would be
those in respect of which the Legislature had made it clear that guilt would
follow proof merely of the proscribed act. The over-all regulatory pattern adopted
by the Legislature, the subject matter of the legislation, the importance of the
penalty, and the precision of the language used will be primary considerations in
determining whether the offence falls into the third category.110
The import of the "Dickson formula" is that any public welfare offence
will prima facie fall within the middle category of strict liability, unless the
legislature uses words that make it abundantly clear that either absolute liabil-
114Brend v. Wood (1946), 62 T.L.R. 462 at 463, 175 L.T. 306 at 307 (D.C.) per
Lord Goddard C.J., cited in Beaver v. The Queen, supra note 33, at 537-38 (S.C.R.),
129 (C.C.C.) per Cartwright J., varying [1956] O.W.N. 798 (C.A.).
115 See, for example, the amount of litigation on the meaning of "possession"; see
Mewett and Manning, supra note 1, at 127.
"10 R. v. Sault Ste. Marie, supra note 7, at 182 (D.L.R.), 374 (C.C.C.).
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ity or full mens rea was specifically intended. In theory, such a formula is
perfectly acceptable, but it completely ignores or fails to accept the realities
of the situation and the difficulties that created the confusion the Court now
claims to have dispelled. It is a sad fact,117 but the legislature is not in the
habit of expressing its intention in a plain and unambiguous manner. The field
of statutory interpretation is fraught with difficulties and the task of eliciting
the intention of Parliament is often a futile one. Indeed, it would not be mis-
representing the situation to say that the legislature deliberately omits to
consider the question of mens rea and leaves the courts with the invidious
task of discovering an intention where none exists.118
It can be safely assumed that the Court did not intend to tamper with
those offences requiring full mens rea, but merely to temper the injustice of
absolute liability offences. However, employing the "Dickson formula," the
boundary between offences requiring full mens rea and those imposing strict
liability becomes fuzzy and blurred. As Lord Cransworth noted in a different
context, "here is no possibility of mistaking midnight for noon; but at what
precise moment twilight becomes darkness is hard to determine."" 9 Offences
the courts previously held to require full mens rea could now be interpreted
as falling within this new middle category. A recent case that serves to illustrate
this point is R. v. Chapin.120 The defendant was charged with hunting for
migratory birds within a quarter mile of a place where bait had been de-
posited, contrary to s. 14(1) of the Migratory Birds Regulations,12' and
the Migratory Birds Convention Act.' 22 The statute was silent on the ques-
tion of mens rea and, therefore, the judges were left to determine whether
or not it was required. At first instance, the defendant was convicted, even
though she was unaware of the presence of the bait. On appeal, Houlden J.A.
dissenting, the Ontario Court of Appeal decided that mens rea was an ingre-
dient of the offence and the defendant was acquitted. The judgments of the
117 Williams argues that such a state of affairs is unavoidable:
Every criminal statute is expressed elliptically. It is not possible in drafting to state
all the exceptions and qualifications that are intended. One does not, for instance,
when creating a new offence, enact that a person under eight years cannot be
convicted. Nor does one enact the defence of insanity or duress. The exemptions
belong to the general part of the criminal law, which is implied into specific
offences. On the Continent, where the criminal law is codified, and similarly in
those parts of the Commonwealth with a criminal code, this general part is placed
by itself in the code and is not repeated for each individual crime. Now the law
of mens rea belongs to the general part of the criminal law, and it is not reason-
able to expect [the legislature] every time it creates a new crime to enact it or
even to make reference to it.
Criminal Law, The General Part (2d ed. London: Stevens, 1961) at 259-60.
118 See Devlin, Samples of Lawmaking (London: Oxford University Press, 1962)
at 71. The speeches in Warner, supra note 99 and Sweet, supra note 52, illustrate the
differences in interpretation that can occur when an intention is attributed to Parliament
when, ex hypothesi, Parliament has given no express indication of that intention.
110 Boyse v. Rossborough (1857), 6 H.L. Cas. 2 at 45, 10 E.R. 1192 at 1210.
120 (1977), 38 C.C.C. (2d) 157. Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada
granted, 38 C.C.C. (2d) 157n. (S.C.C.).
121 SOR/71-376.
122 R.S.C. 1970, c. M-12.
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Court present a perfect example of how the judges felt obliged to go to one
extreme or the other when, in fact, it is probable that all three judges could
have agreed upon the test enunciated in Sault Ste. Marie.
Weatherston J.A., whose judgment was concurred in by Brooke J.A.,
recognized the deep concern and public interest in the protection of migratory
birds, but felt that this did not warrant the conviction of a perfectly innocent
person who, whatever precautions she had taken, could not have avoided
infringing the law. On the other hand, Houlden J.A., relying on the decision
in Pierce Fisheries,'2 3 gave greater weight to the public interest.
From the language and the subject-matter of the statute, I think it is clear that
s. 14(1) does not require mens rea. Indeed, to require mens rea would, in my
opinion, nullify the effect of the subsection, since it would be difficult, if not im-
possible, for the Crown to prove a violation. The appellant's lack of knowledge
that bait had been deposited within one-quarter mile of the place where she was
hunting is, therefore, no defence to her.'2 4
All three judges considered the idea of a defence of reasonable care, but
they were unsure of its standing in Canadian law. Also, they did not feel that
there was a sufficient finding of fact by the trial judge to ground conclusively
such a defence. Consequently, if Chapin were decided today, it is almost
certain that the defendant would have been afforded the defence of due dili-
gence. Being an obvious public welfare offence, 25 it falls under the initial
presumption and, as there is no clear indication of legislative intent, there
is no evidence to dislodge or rebut such a presumption.
However, not all cases will be disposed of in such a satisfactory and
ameliorating way. With the scope and concept of public welfare offences being
so vague and loose,126 there is a distinct possibility that the prosecution might
be tempted to argue, and the courts be persuaded to accept, that certain
offences, which previously required full mens rea, now fall more correctly into
the middle category of strict liability. An example of this state of affairs is
provided by the circumstances in Lim Chin Aik. 12 7 In this Singaporean case,
123 R. v. Pierce Fisheries Ltd., supra note 33.
124 R. v. Chapin, supra note 120, at 160.
125 See text accompanying note 65, supra. Since this article was written, but beforo
publication, Chapin went to the Supreme Court of Canada. In a unanimous judgment,
delivered by Mr. Justice Dickson on March 20, 1979, the Court took an approach very
similar to that suggested in the text. It found that the offence in question was one ot
strict liability and, applying the decision in Sault Ste. Marie, held that "the accused may
absolve himself on proof that he took all the care which a reasonable man might have
been expected to take in all the circumstances or, in other words, that he was in no
way negligent."
The Court maintained that the Act was clearly a piece of legislation designed to
promote the general welfare of the public and, therefore, prima facie fell into the middle
category of liability. As it could not be construed as a "true crime," nor could the
language of the offence be said to convey in an unequivocal fashion that the legislaturo
intended to impose absolute liability, this initial presumption could not be rebutted and
the offence was one of strict liability. Finally, the Court did not feel that it was necessary
to send the case back for a new trial as, after a careful consideration of all the evidence,
it thought that it would have been unreasonable to have convicted Mrs. Chapin.
126 R. v. Chapin, id.
127 Supra note 99.
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the defendant was charged with and convicted of remaining unlawfully in the
Colony after a prohibition order against him, although he was unaware of
any such order having been made. The Privy Council felt that, in spite of the
absence of any express words requiring full mens rea, the presumption in
favour of mens rea remained unrebutted where the defendant's organization
of his conduct could not have resulted in compliance with or observance of
the law: "[I]t cannot be inferred that the legislature imposed [absolute] liability
merely in order to find a luckless victim.' 28 According to the "Dickson for-
mula," however, such an offence would be one of negligence. In such circum-
stances, where the consequences of conviction are of a very grave nature,
namely, permanent exclusion from a country where one's family lived, it would
be unjust to make such an offence one of negligence. This would result in an
unhealthy situation where "the negligent are lumped together with the callous
and the real villains are never singled out."' 2 9 In effect, the end result of the
innovation of the middle category may be to soften the aversion to strict
liability so that it becomes a repository for many offences which otherwise
have been interpreted to require proof of intention. This hazard was alluded
to by F. B. Sayre nearly fifty years ago:
The modern rapid growth of a large body of offences punishable without proof
of a guilty intent is marked with real danger. Courts are familiarized with the
pathway to easy convictions by relaxing the orthodox requirement of a mens rea.
The danger is that in the case of true crimes where the penalty is severe and the
need for ordinary criminal safeguards is strong, courts following the false analogy
of the public welfare offences may now and again similarly relax the mens rea
requirement, particularly in the case of unpopular crimes, as the easiest way to
secure convictions. 130
Nevertheless, if the court concludes that the legislature did not intend
to create an offence requiring full mens rea, it must then proceed to determine
whether the offence in question imposes strict or absolute liability. At first
blush, the test seems clear and simple: offences not requiring full mens rea
impose strict liability unless the legislature makes "it clear that guilt will
follow proof merely of the proscribed act."'131 For instance, in the very recent
case of Grottoli,132 the Ontario Court of Appeal was presented with an early
opportunity to apply the test laid down in Sault Ste. Marie. The case involved
the interpretation of certain offences under the 1970 Food and Drugs Act, a
classic example of public welfare legislation. The defendant, a proprietor of
a meat market, was charged that he "did unlawfully sell . . . an article of
food.., likely to create an erroneous impression ... as to its composition.' 133
At first instance, the defendant was acquitted, as the provincial judge held
that proof of mens rea was required, but none had been forthcoming. In the
Ontario Court of Appeal, the Court was of the opinion that the offence was
of a public welfare nature and prima facie fell into the new middle category
128 Id. at 174.
129 Hogan, supra note 4, at 261.
130 Sayre, supra note 66, at 79.
131 R. v. Sault Ste. Marie, supra note 7, at 182 (D.L.R.), 374 (C.C.C.).
132 Not yet reported, August 9, 1978.
133 Food and Drugs Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. F-27, s. 5(1).
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as set out in Sault Ste. Marie. However, as the Act allowed the defence of
due diligence in respect of other offences under the Act involving pre-pack-
aged goods, 134 it was held that the presumption had been impliedly rebutted
by the legislature and absolute liability was intended.
In such circumstances where the intention of the legislature is made
manifest, the "Dickson formula" provides an effective method of categoriza-
tion. However, in the great majority of public welfare statutes, the intention
of the legislature is woefully obscure. In attempting to meet such a situation,
the Court suggests a number of criteria that may be considered in resolving
this problem of whether an offence imposes strict or absolute liability: "the
over-all regulatory pattern adopted by the Legislature, the subject matter of
the legislation, the importance of the penalty, and the precision of the lan-
guage." 135 These are largely the same factors that are to be used in deciding
whether or not an offence is of a public welfare nature. Consequently, the
courts are being asked to utilize the same test in trying to solve two entirely
different problems. By relying on such a loose and imprecise test, the judge's
outlook and sense of social justice will continue to be a decisive, if an un-
avowed, consideration in the categorization process and, as such, will remain
a very real obstacle to the accurate prediction of the degree of liability re-
quired in any particular offence.
A topical illustration of the difficulties that Sault Ste. Marie might cause
for the lower courts in interpreting and applying existing legislation is pro-
vided by a case that is currently under appeal in Ontario, R. v. Z-H Paper
Products Ltd.136 An employee of the defendant company was injured while
cleaning a machine that was in motion, even though he had been told re-
peatedly and expressly not to do that. The defendant was charged with failing
to ensure that the necessary precautions and procedures were followed under
section 24(1) (c) of The Industrial Safety Act, 1971.137 At first instance, the
provincial judge, while recognizing The diligence and conscientiousness of the
company, held that the offence was one of absolute liability and, therefore,
it was not open to the defendant to exculpate itself by showing that it was
free of fault. The appeal is likely to centre upon the interpretation of section
21(3) of that same Act:
An employer shall take every precaution reasonable in the circumstances for the
protection of an employee in the industrial establishment, but this provision shall
not be applied to affect the strict duty imposed by subsection 1.138 (Emphasis
added).
Remembering the special meaning attached to "strict" by the Court, it will
be extremely interesting to see how the courts deal with such a situation.
134 s. 29(1). This form of statutory interpretation was expressly disapproved of by
Lord Evershed in Lim-Chin Aik, supra note 99, at 173 and 176; and by Lord Reid in
Sweet, supra note 52, at 149.
135 R. v. Sault Ste. Marie, supra note 7, at 182 (D.L.R.), 374 (C.C.C.).
136 April 5, 1978 (Prov. Ct.).
137 S.O. 1971, c. 43.
138 Id.
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Moreover, it raises some intriguing and wider questions of how statutes,
drafted in the light of then existing principles of common law, are to be
interpreted if there is a significant change in the underlying structure of
this law.
Finally, in Sault Ste. Marie itself, the problem concerned the interpreta-
tion of the words "cause" and "permit" and, as the Court noted, "these two
words are troublesome because neither denotes clearly 'either full mens rea
or absolute liability.""u 9 Having listed ample authority to support both con-
clusions,14 0 the Court felt justified in concluding that "the conflict... shows
that in themselves the words 'cause' and 'permit' fit much better into an
offence of strict liability than either full mens rea or absolute liability.' 41
The logic of such an argument is entirely delusory. Although the Court was
correct in stressing the fact that pollution is a public welfare offence meriting
being placed prima facie in the middle category and that as "valid provincial
legislation it cannot possibly create an offence which is criminal in the true
sense,"' 42 the existence of earlier conflicting authorities is not of itself capable
of leading to such a conclusion. There lurks a suspicion that the true rationale
behind such a conclusion is that where divided opinion existed previously, the
words creating the offence should be construed as intending the imposition
of strict liability, that is, the making available of a defence of due diligence
to the defendant. Moreover, if that were so, the result-oriented basis of the
decision goes part of the way to explaining some of the logic followed and
arguments favoured by the Court. In effect, the Court decided that the offence
in question warranted a defence of due diligence and proceeded to construct
and articulate a scheme that would meet this purpose. Such an expedient
and result-oriented process of reasoning is not conducive to a clear and
authoritative statement of legal principles intended to dispel the doubt and
confusion that previously existed.
139 Supra note 7, at 183 (D.L.R.), 375 (C.C.C.).
140 Authorities cited by the Court in R. v. Sault Ste. Marie, id. at 183 (D.L.R.), 375
(C.C.C.) in favour of a requirement of mens rea included: James & Son Ltd. v. Smee,
[1955] 1 Q.B. 78; Somerset v. Hart (1884), 12 Q.B.C. 360; Gray's Haulage Co. v. Arnold,
[1966] 1 All E.R. 896 (Q.B.); Lovelace v. DPP, [1954] 3 All E.R. 481 (D.C.); Ross
Hillnan Ltd. v. Bond, [1974] Q.B. 435, [1974] 2 All E.R. 287 (D.C.). In favour of no
requirement of mens rea, the authorities cited by the Court included Miller v. The Queen,
[1954] 1 D.L.R. 148, 10 W.W.R. (N.S.) 145, 107 C.C.C. 321 (Man. C.A.); R. v. Royal
Canadian Legion, [1971] 3 O.R. 552, 21 D.L.R. (3d) 148, 4 C.C.C. (2d) 196 (Ont.
C.A.); R. v. Teperman & Sons Ltd., [1968] 2 O.R. 174, [1968] 4 C.C.C. 67 (C.A.); R. v.
Jack Cewe Ltd. (1975), 23 C.C.C. (2d) 237 (B.C.Co.Ct.); Browning v. J. W. H. Watson
(Rochester) Ltd., [1953] 2 All E.R. 775 (D.C.); Lyons v. May, [1948] 2 All E.R. 1062
(D.C.); Korten v. West Sussex C.C. (1903), 72 L.J.K.B. 514; R. v. Peconi (1907), 1
C.C.C. (2d) 213 (Ont. H.C.); Alphacell Ltd. v. Woodward, [1972] A.C. 824 (H.L.), aff'g
[1972] 1 Q.B. 127; Sopp v. Long, [1970] 1 Q.B. 518 sub nom. Long v. Sopp, [1969] 1 All
E.R. 855 (C.A.); Laird v. Dobell, [1906] 1 K.B. 131; Shave v. Rosner, [1954] 2 Q.B.
113 (D.C.). There can be little doubt that such authorities are far from being equally
balanced. The weight and quality of authority clearly favours the position of not requiring
full mens rea.
14 1 R. v. Sault Ste. Marie, id. at 183 (D.L.R.), 375 (C.C.C.).
142 Id. at 182 (D.L.R.), 375 (C.C.C.).
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VI. CONCLUSION
This paper has tried to present a thorough and critical analysis of the
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Sault Ste. Marie and to unearth
some of the broader policies which underlie its conclusions on the role that
mens rea is to play in public welfare offences. A number of possible diffi-
culties with its decision have been brought out, but the acid test will be its
practical utility and the effect it will have upon the actual administration and
enforcement of the ever-widening field of public welfare offences. However,
although the Court has taken a significant and welcome step forward in devel-
oping a "halfway house" of liability, it is more than likely that the Court will
be troubled again by the question of absolute liability offences in the not too
distant future. It is hoped that, when such a situation arises, the Court will
take the time and trouble to articulate its overall policy in matters of criminal
liability, to develop a keener perception of its own role in the entire legal
process, and to complete the job it started so promisingly in Sault Ste. Marie.
